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MICHELA MASSIMI
Abstract
In this paper I raise a difficulty for Joseph LaPorte’s account of chemical kind terms.
LaPorte has argued against Putnam that H2O content is neither necessary nor
sufficient to fix the reference of the kind term ‘water’ and that we did not discover
that water is H2O. To this purpose, he revisits Putnam’s Twin Earth story with
the fictional scenario of Deuterium Earth, whose ocean consists of ‘dwater’, to con-
clude that we did not discover that deuterium oxide is (a kind of) water (usually called
‘heavy water’). Instead, according to LaPorte, by including deuterium oxide in the
extension of the term ‘water’, we simply refined our vague use of the term ‘water’.
But we could have decided to exclude deuterium oxide from the extension of the
term ‘water’. Let us call this the thesis of semantic stipulation.
I raise two problems for LaPorte’s Deuterium Earth story. First, I show that
‘dwater’ (i.e. deuterium oxide not as a kind of water) does not have the same scientific
credibility of ‘heavy water’ (i.e. deuterium oxide as a kind of water). Second, I argue
that for the thesis of semantic stipulation to go through one would need to show that
‘dwater’ is semantically on a par with ‘heavy water’. Namely, onewould need to show
that ‘dwater’ is a projectible kind term, capable of supporting inductive inferences.
But, in fact, it is not, because the term is vulnerable to an unwelcome
Goodmanian scenario, unless one surreptitiously reintroduces some Putnamian
assumptions about D2O content being necessary and sufficient to fix the reference
of the term.
1. Introduction
In Natural kinds and conceptual change, Joseph LaPorte1 puts
forward an innovative view of natural kind terms, according to
which the use of such terms is vague. Following a well-known lin-
guistic tradition, he calls the hidden vagueness in the use of a term,
which is later exposed as our knowledge grows, ‘open texture’.2
Natural kind terms are then subject to meaning-change over time,
whereby meaning-change should not be understood as synonymous
with conceptual-change of the Kuhnian type, but instead as
1 Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
2 Op. cit., 97.
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precisification of kind terms with open texture. LaPorte combines
precisification with a Kripkean defence of the rigidity of kind
terms. Any kind term rigidly designates the same kind in all possible
worlds, although the extension of the kind term in question may
change from one world to another, and even within the same world
before and after a scientific revolution. Since there is an element of
semantic stipulation as to how we refine the use of a vague kind
term, LaPorte takes kind terms as rigid de jure, but not de facto.3
Under the Kripke–Putnam view, rigidity accomplishes the other
important job of getting kind terms hooked up to their referents.
For example, the term ‘water’ refers to whatever possesses some
underlying properties and relations that – empirically discovered –
guarantee sameness of kind to paradigm water. But LaPorte argues
that this is instead the role of the causal theory of reference and not
of rigidity, and accuses Putnam of conflating the two.4
Against Putnam’s causal theory of reference, LaPorte maintains
that possessing underlying properties and relations does not guaran-
tee sameness of kind to paradigm samples. For example, beingH2O is
neither necessary nor sufficient for being water; nor did we discover
that water is H2O. On the contrary, if confronted with XYZwemight
conclude that ‘XYZ is water’; or vice versa, if confronted with H2O
having unusual characteristics, we might conclude that ‘Some H2O
is not water’.5 LaPorte concludes that the kind term ‘water’ is
vague and changes its meaning over time, so that XYZ is neither
clearly in nor clearly out of the extension of the term until a decision
is made by speakers to include or exclude it. Such stipulation on
behalf of speakers would amount to a precisification of the term; it
would not be a scientific discovery. To illustrate this point,
LaPorte revisits Putnam’s Twin Earth story with the fictional scen-
ario of Deuterium Earth.6 The story is functional to LaPorte’s
point that scientists stipulated that deuterium oxide (D2O), i.e. one
of the most relevant isotopic varieties of water, is a kind of water
(usually called ‘heavy water’). But they could have chosen otherwise,
and theywould not have beenwrong in doing so, anymore thanwe are
right in including deuterium oxide in the extension of ‘water’. Let us
call this the thesis of semantic stipulation.
LaPorte’s argument draws on the mixed nature of the liquid that
we normally call ‘water’. Naturally occurring water is not 100%
3 Op. cit., 47.
4 Op. cit., 43.
5 Op. cit., 93.
6 Op. cit., 104–107.
532
Michela Massimi
H2O. For example, ocean water contains also a small percentage of
deuterium oxide (of the order of 0.015%, upon LaPorte’s indication),
without counting percentages of other isotopic varieties (such as
tritium oxide, oxygen-18, etc.), as well as salt and gold, among
other substances. Following a strategy already deployed against
Barbara Abbott’s7 Putnamian defence of water being H2O,
LaPorte8 tacitly uses the mixed nature of any ocean water sample as
an argument against the claim that H2O content is necessary and suf-
ficient to determine the reference of the term ‘water’.9
In this paper, I object to LaPorte’s Deuterium Earth story on two
main grounds. First, scientific history belies LaPorte’s intuitions as
to why the Earthlings would have good reasons for not counting
the Deuterium Earth’s ocean liquid as a kind of water. Second, if
we take LaPorte’s view seriously, an unwelcome Goodmanian scen-
ario may arise. In Section 2, I briefly review LaPorte’s Deuterium
Earth story and conclude that for the thesis of semantic stipulation
to go through, one would need to prove that ‘dwater’ (as the
Earthlings dub the Deuterium Earth’s liquid) is a vernacular kind
term on equal (scientific and semantic) footing with ‘heavy water’.
Or better, one would have to prove that the two options:
(A) D2O is not a kind of water (let us call it ‘dwater’, as the
Earthlings call it)
(B) D2O is a kind of water (let us call it ‘heavy water’, as the Earth
scientists call it)
are on a par, and in particular that option (A) is a live option with
equal semantic status and scientific credibility as option (B). But I
contend that it has neither. In Section 3, I show that option (A)
does not have the same scientific credibility of (B), because D2O
does bear after all the same microstructural-kind relation towhat we or-
dinarily call ‘water’. In Section 4, I show that option (A) does not
7 B. Abbott ‘ANote on the Nature of “Water”’,Mind 106 (1997), 311–9.
8 See J. LaPorte, ‘Living water’,Mind 107 (1998), 451–5.
9 Under a Putnamian view, being H2O is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for being water insofar as the threshold of impurities is lower than
20% (see H. Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1998), 31). But LaPorte (1998), op. cit. note 8, has attacked this
claim by noting how a cutoff at 20% is not sufficiently fine-grained a net
to determine the reference of the term ‘water’. By trading on the fact that
the content of theGreat Salt Lake inUtah contains twenty-eight percent im-
purities, LaPorte concludes that a jellyfish, a tomato, and an infant would
count as ‘water’ in virtue of containing fewer impurities than the lake in
Utah.
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enjoy an equal semantic status with option (B) either, because for
‘dwater’ to be a genuine kind term, it would have to be projectible,
i.e. it would have to support successful inductive inferences. But,
as it happens, the term is non-projectible and vulnerable to an unwel-
comeGoodmanian scenario. In Section 4.2, I present a series of poss-
ible responses to the Goodmanian scenario and I conclude that none
of them successfully evades it.
2. LaPorte on Deuterium Earth
LaPorte’s thesis of semantic stipulation derives its compelling force
from his apt variation of Putnam’s Twin Earth story. LaPorte pre-
sents us with the fictional scenario of Deuterium Earth visited by
the Earthlings in 1905.10 The space travellers land on Deuterium
Earth equipped with samples of various biological and chemical sub-
stances from planet Earth, which they soon begin to compare with
the substances populating Deuterium Earth. The water-like liquid
that fills the ocean, and that looks prima facie identical to the
Earthlings’ sample of water from planet Earth, reveals soon some dis-
similarities even before molecular testing is done: no fish or aquatic
plant can live in it and its boiling and melting points differ from
the ones of water.
The Earthlings dub the non-better-identified microstructure PQR
and find also traces of PQR in their own ocean-water sample from
planet Earth (in the order of 0.015%). ‘Eventually, through sophisti-
cated testing’,11 the Earthlings find out that thewater-like liquid con-
sists of hydrogen atoms, whose mass is greater than the mass of
ordinary hydrogen atoms, because of one neutron (in addition to
the proton) in the nucleus. In honour of Deuterium Earth, they
call the new element ‘deuterium’.
The Earthlings learn from theDeuteriumEarthlings that an explo-
sive weapon was built with deuterium and that the explosion caused a
whole island to vanish.12 No such bomb is known to the Earthlings.
Thus, in the light of all these differences, the Earthlings decide to dub
thewater-like liquid that fills the ocean onDeuterium Earth ‘dwater’,
so as to distinguish it from ‘water’.
Thirty years elapse: it is the year 1935 when the Earthlings at last
return to planet Earth, bringing with them samples of substances
10 Op. cit. note 1, 104–107.
11 Op. cit., 105.
12 Op. cit., 106.
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from Deuterium Earth. When confronted with the ocean-sample of
‘dwater’, the scientists on Earth respond disappointingly that it is
not a new liquid but just a chemical variety of water, made up by
the hydrogen isotope, which they had coincidentally called ‘deuter-
ium’ to distinguish it from protium (i.e. the hydrogen atom, whose
nucleus consists of one proton only). LaPorte draws the following
moral from the story:
What do I think this story shows? I think it shows that we did not
discover that deuterium oxide is water. Hence we did not discover
that water is identical to H2O. We could have concluded that
some H2O (the variety that is D2O) is not what we had been
calling ‘water’, as our space travellers concluded. I think the
decision that just H2O made with protium bears the same micro-
structural kind to the majority of what we called ‘water’ would
have been no less acceptable a conclusion than that H2O bears
the key relation. We cannot say that our space travellers were
just flat wrong in concluding that D2O is not what they had
been calling ‘water’ and that we are just plain right in concluding
that it is.13
In sum, ‘water’ is a kind term with open texture and it is a matter of
semantic stipulation whether we decide to include or not deuterium
oxide in its extension. We could have gone either way. Or, so
LaPorte argues. This is what I call the thesis of semantic stipulation.
Alexander Bird14 attacks LaPorte on this specific point by noting
how chemistry is the science of substances, and that although the
space travellers might have been right in not counting D2O as
water, their reasons were practical rather than chemical: ‘if you
want to know what a substance is rather than what it will do to your
body or whether you can make a fusion bomb from it, you turn to a
chemist’.15 Moreover, Bird draws attention to the use of vernacular
kind terms as opposed to natural kind terms and to Putnam’s division
of linguistic labour to conclude: ‘the claims about open texture are
most plausible concerning vernacular terms that appear to be
natural kind terms. But important identity statements in science are
13 Op. cit., 107, 110.
14 A. Bird, ‘A posteriori knowledge of natural kind essences: a defence’,
Philosophical Topics 35 (2007), 293–312.
15 Op. cit. note 14, 299. See also A. Bird, ‘Discovering the essences of
natural kinds’, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary (eds) The Semantics
and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds (New York: Routledge, 2009), 128.
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not just those that conjoin a vernacular kind term with a scientific
one’.16
I follow up on Bird in arguing against LaPorte that it is not the case
that we could have gone either for the Earthlings’ option of not in-
cluding D2O in the extension of water, or for the Earth scientists’
reverse option. In other words, it is not the case that the two
options are on a par, i.e. that whether or not D2O is a kind of water
is ultimately a matter of semantic stipulation. My line of argument
departs from Bird in two respects: (1) I think that LaPorte is after
all correct in claiming that the Earthlings’ reasons for taking D2O
not as a kind of water are ultimately of chemical (as opposed to prac-
tical) nature; and (2) I also think that LaPorte is correct in stressing
the importance of vernacular kind terms with open texture for scien-
tific claims (in particular, I am thinking of the role of vernacular kind
terms for inductive inferences, as opposed to theoretical identity
statements).
Whilst I concede these two points, I do not think they jointly license
the thesis of semantic stipulation. For the thesis to be defensible – out
of the seemingly compelling force of the fictional scenario –we need to
assess whether the Earthlings’ conclusion that D2O is not a kind of
water but instead a new chemical substance (called ‘dwater’) stands
up scientific and semantic scrutiny. In the next two Sections, I cast
doubt on both.
The two points are related. For ‘dwater’ to have the semantic status
of a genuine kind term, it would have to be projectible: i.e., it would
have to support successful inductive inferences. But I am going to
argue that the term is either non-projectible; or its projectibility
depends ultimately on facts about the D2O content of the new
liquid as an isotopic kind of water. I must then first show that facts
about theD2O content ofDeuteriumEarth’s ocean liquid underwrite
the conclusion that it is an isotopic kind of water.
3. Why ‘dwater’ does not have the same scientific credibility
as ‘heavy water’. The Deuterium Earth story continued
In this Section, I show that the Earthlings are in fact wrong in think-
ing that D2O is not a kind of water. Facts about the D2O content of
Deuterium Earth’s ocean liquid underwrite its nature as an isotopic
kind of water; and there are reasons – I think – for resisting
LaPorte’s conclusion that some H2O (for example, the D2O variety
16 Bird 2009, op. cit note 15, 135.
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of it) is not what we have been calling ‘water’. Let me continue the
Deuterium Earth’s story where LaPorte’s one ends, following this
time the historical records about the discovery of deuterium, and
the ensuing scientific debate.
It is the year 1935. The Earthlings have at last returned to planet
Earth after more than thirty years field-work on Deuterium Earth.
They present a jar of Deuterium Earth’s ocean liquid to the Earth
scientists, who upon investigation conclude that it is not a new
liquid but just a new kind of water that they have themselves recently
discovered and independently called ‘deuterium oxide’ or ‘heavy
water’ (the first is the scientific kind term, the second is the vernacular
kind term).17 Lots of things have happened in the scientific world
since the Earthlings left planet Earth in 1905 – the Earth scientists
explain to the Earthlings.
‘To start with, in 1919 the isotopic constitution of elements became
well-known. The term “isotope” was originally used by Frederick
Soddy to designate chemically non-separable varieties of the same
element, whereby in the case of heavy radioactive atoms the differ-
ences in atomic weight did not give rise to observable chemical differ-
ences. But the use of the term has changed since (despite Soddy’s
acrimonious defence of the original meaning): now (i.e. in 1935)
the term “isotope” is ordinarily used to indicate atoms with the
same nuclear charge but different atomic weight’.
‘This leads us’ – as the Earth scientists hasten to explain to the
Earthlings – ‘to the rather delicate issue of finding a suitable name
for the new liquid, following up on the discovery in 1931 of the hy-
drogen isotope containing a neutron in addition to the proton, by
three American scientists.18 Urey discovered the new isotope by eva-
porating liquid hydrogen at low temperatures, and examining the re-
sultant spectral lines. His discovery followed of one year the discovery
of two other isotopes of oxygen (i.e., 17O, 18O in addition to the
known 16O), on the basis of a measured discrepancy for the hydrogen
atomic weight’.
17 Henceforth I use the vernacular kind term for the purpose of compar-
ing it with the Earthlings’ vernacular kind term ‘dwater’ under the assump-
tion that both Earthlings and Earth scientists would agree in using the
scientific kind term ‘deuterium oxide’ to refer to D2O, but they would
diverge in the use of the vernacular kind term to stress their divergent
opinions as to whether D2O is or is not a kind of water.
18 Urey,H.C., Brickwedde, F.G.,Murphy,G.M. ‘AHydrogen Isotope
of Mass 2’, Physical Review 39 (1932), 164–165.
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The Earth scientists continue their report to the Earthlings: ‘The
choice of a name has proved rather difficult and it has been the
subject of lively discussion. The Times of 9 December 1933 an-
nounced in a column the discovery of “heavy hydrogen” as a “a
new kind of water”, which has escaped discovery hitherto only
because of its very small quantity in nature compared to ordinary hy-
drogen, and whose presence in ordinary water would significantly
alter the ability of water to support life. The search for a suitable
name was open and an entire meeting of the Royal Society was dedi-
cated to it on 14 December 1933’.19
‘At the meeting, Soddy, the father of isotopy, refused to consider
this element as an “isotope” on the ground that it defied his original
meaning of “isotope”, reserved – as it was – to chemically non-separ-
able varieties of the same element.20 But other physicists were of a
different advice. Lord Rutherford, for example, retorted to Soddy
that the term “isotope” was now extended to include chemically se-
parable elements having the same nuclear charge and different
mass, and he himself proposed the name “diplogen” for the new
element. “Diplogen”, meaning in Greek double, found some enthu-
siastic reception among the scientists present at the meeting,
because, in the words of Sidgwick, “the interesting thing about it is
not that it is the second lightest particle….[but rather] that it is
double the first one”.21 Moreover, since the atomic volume and
atomic number are the same as the hydrogen, the physical properties
of this substance would not differ much from those of hydrogen, to
the point that – as Dr Aston reported at the meeting – Prof. Bohr pre-
ferred to call it simply “hydrogen” since its atomic number was 1 and
it was not a new element. Yet, there are some noticeable differences in
the chemical behaviour of the new element, especially its rate of dif-
fusion and chemical reactions, which were duly reported at the Royal
Society meeting’.
‘Although these isotopic species of water molecules are physically
and chemically very similar’, the Earth scientists continue, ‘they
give rise to divergences at the macroscopic level of thermodynamic
properties such as temperature of maximum density, heat capacity,
volume and compressibility. For example, the temperature of
maximum density, that is the temperature at which (∂ρ/∂T)p= 0
is 3.98 °C at atmospheric pressure for H2O, but becomes higher
19 See E. Rutherford, et al., ‘Discussion on heavy hydrogen’,
Proceedings of the Royal Society A 144 (1934), 1–28.
20 Op. cit note 19, 14.
21 Op. cit, 6.
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(of the order of 11.44 °C) for D2O. Hence, the different melting
and freezing points of the two liquids. Those macroscopic changes
are due to the complex dynamics of liquid water, where both intra-
molecular vibrational modes and bending and stretching of the
hydrogen-bonds and O–D bonds enter. And in biochemical reac-
tions, replacing ordinary hydrogen with “heavy hydrogen” has far-
reaching effects on the way living cells operate.’
‘Until a year ago (i.e. 1934), 2H still did not have a universally
agreed name. Urey suggested “hydrogen two” for its nucleus and
“pycnogen” for the element itself; Gilbert Lewis was in favour of
taking 2H as an element in its own right called “dygen”, and called
its nucleus “dyon”. Eventually, Urey opted for “deuterium”, upon
suggestion of professors in the Dept. of Greek, and the name has
now been universally accepted’.22
‘It has also became clear’, the Earth scientists point out, ‘that given
the very low percentage of “heavy water” contained in naturally oc-
curring water, producing pure heavy water by electrolysis of ordinary
water is a very difficult and expensive process. To produce one kilo-
gram of heavy water, 50 tons of ordinary water have to be treated for
one year, consuming 320.000 kilowatt hours, and, the output would
still have a purity no better than about ten per cent’.23 ‘The first in-
dustrial scale production of heavy water has just opened in Vemork,
Norway, a year ago (in 1934)’, the Earth scientists continue, ‘and
scientists are all excited at the prospects of its possible applications
in biochemistry, and even its possible therapeutic uses. We are still
working on possible methods of estimating the quantity of deuterium
in naturally occurring hydrogen, following up on the works of Drs. L
and A. Farkas, but all the evidence points to a very low percentage
which could potentially create problems when it comes to industrial
scale production.’
Here the report of the Earth scientists to the Earthlings on heavy
water ends, as of 1935. The following events are now history. The
nuclear plant in Vemork was bound to play a key role in the nuclear
race that eventually led to the production of the H-bomb.24 During
World War II and throughout the 1950s and 1970s, scientists ex-
plored a variety of methods for production of heavy water on indus-
trial scale, the two main ones being distillation processes from water
or hydrogen, and chemical exchange processes involving either
22 See P. F. Dahl, Heavy water and the wartime race for nuclear energy
(Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999), 29–30.
23 Op. cit note 22, 41.
24 See op. cit. note 22.
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water-hydrogen or water-hydrogen-sulfide. In both types of pro-
cesses, the production of heavy water faced a serious challenge due
to the very low deuterium-to-hydrogen ratio in nature.25
Ordinary water has indeed turned out to be a mixture of various
isotopic varieties, such as 1H2
16O, 1H2
18O, 1H2
17O, 1H2H16O.
Isotopic variation is not normally regarded as relevant for the
purpose of calculating physical properties of water because those
properties do not vary much on a molar basis.26 But it does become
relevant when dealing with macroscopic, thermodynamic properties
dependent on the atomic weight of the molecules.27
25 In the words of Howard Rae, Separation of hydrogen isotopes
(Washington, DC: American Chemical Society, 1978), 3, from Chalk
River Nuclear Laboratories of Ontario (Canada): ‘This very low value of
the deuterium-to-hydrogen ratio in nature of about 150 ppm is the main
factor responsible for the high cost of heavy water. It is necessary to
process at least 8000 mols of feed per mol of product for all
processes…Thus, the overall concentration ratio from feed to product is
about 3 × 106. This means that hundreds of separative elements in series
are needed to go from natural water to reactor grade heavy water.’
26 F. Franks,Water: a matrix of life (Cambridge: The Royal Society of
Chemistry, 2000), 19.
27 Incidentally, this is one of the motivations for Paul Needham’s sug-
gestion that microstructural features should not be invoked to classify
chemical substances, and instead macroscopic thermodynamic features,
such as Gibbs’ rule provide more helpful standards for classifying sub-
stances (see Needham ‘What is water?’, Analysis 60 (2000), 13–21; and
Needham ‘The discovery that water is H2O’, International Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 16 (2002), 205–226). On Needham’s account, deuter-
ium oxide would indeed qualify as a separate chemical substance (for a criti-
cism of thermodynamic considerations as a criterion for classifying chemical
substances, see R. Hendry ‘Entropy and chemical substance’, Philosophy of
Science 77 (2010), 921–932). Although Needham’s suggestion is a helpful
one, in what follows I stick with scientific orthodoxy in taking the micro-
scopic atomic-number dependent properties as the basis for chemical
elements’ classifications (as per periodic table), and in taking the macro-
scopic thermodynamic properties as supervenient on them. In particular,
I endorse Robin Hendry’s (‘Microstructuralism: problems and prospects’,
in K. Ruthenberg and J. van Brakel (eds.) Stuff: the nature of chemical sub-
stances (Würzburg: Königshausen und von Neumann, 2008), 118) charac-
terization of microstructuralism as ‘committed to two dependence theses:
(i) the physical exhaustion of the chemical (take away the microphysical
properties and there is nothing chemical left), and (ii) supervenience of
chemical kind membership on microphysical properties (there can be no
change, or difference, in chemical kind membership without some change,
or difference, in microphysical properties’ intended as a non-reductionist
540
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What lessons should we draw from the intricate (historical and
scientific) details of the ‘Deuterium Earth story continued’? The
first obvious lesson is the sheer historical contingency of dubbing
and re-dubbing, echoing Hacking’s.28 That Urey’s ‘deuterium’ was
ultimately chosen over Rutherford’s ‘diplogen’ or Lewis’s ‘dygen’
is a sheer historical contingency, based on the tacit principle that
the discoverer gets priority in naming. We might well have chosen
‘dwater’ to designate D2O. But one thing is certain. From these
series of historical contingencies of dubbing and re-dubbing, it
does not follow that we did not discover that D2O is a kind of water.
Nor does it follow – as LaPorte recommends – that D2O content is
neither necessary nor sufficient to fix the reference of both ‘dwater’
and ‘heavy water’. I take it that for a paradigm sample of D2O not
to be baptised as a kind of water, but as some new liquid, a main con-
dition would need be satisfied:
(I) the paradigm sample of D2O would have to bear no same micro-
structural-kind relation to any ordinary sample of water in our planet.
But in fact, any paradigm sample of D2O would fail to meet con-
dition (I.) on two distinct grounds:
i. isotopes, although not chemically identical, share nonetheless
many physical properties, given the same atomic number –
which is the reason why they do not occupy separate places in
the periodic table (Bohr lost the battle of dubbing, but won
the war on the periodic table).29 Hence, given the same
atomic number, and given our system of periodic classification,
thesis. My goal here is to assess LaPorte’s criticism of Putnam’s view that it is
the relation same microstructural kind to paradigm sample of ‘water’ in our
actual world that establishes whether deuterium oxide is a kind of water.
Whether or not microstructuralism is in turn correct as a view of chemical
classification is a separate issue, which falls outside the aim and scope of this
paper.
28 I. Hacking, ‘The contingencies of ambiguity’, Analysis 67 (2007),
269–77.
29 Robin Hendry (‘Elements, compounds and other chemical kinds’,
Philosophy of Science 73 (2006), 864–875; and ‘The elements and conceptual
change’, in H. Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary (eds) The Semantics and
Metaphysics ofNaturalKinds (NewYork: Routledge, 2010), 148) has poign-
antly stressed this point against LaPorte by noting how atomicmass bears no
close relationship to chemical behaviour because isotopes of two different
elements may share the same atomic weight.
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scientists are justified in counting isotopic varieties of water
(such as D2O) as kinds of ‘water’.30 The physical properties of
D2O and H2O on a molar basis are sufficiently similar, and
differences emerge at themacroscopic level of their thermodyn-
amic properties (such as temperature of maximum density). On
the basis of physical similarity at the molar basis, there is again
no overwhelming reason for counting deuterium oxide as a dis-
tinct substance from ordinary water, which recall is not pure
protium oxide but a mixture of several isotopic varieties
(although LaPorte is correct in noting that at the macroscopic
level of properties, including its melting and freezing points,
it looks like adistinct substance).Then,D2Odiffers fromordin-
ary H2O at the level of chemicalmacroscopic properties, but not
at the level of the physicalmicroscopicproperties. But to count as
a distinct substance not bearing same microstructural-kind
relation, D2O would need to differ from ordinary H2O in
terms of physical and chemical properties, which is not the case.
ii. Most importantly, naturally occurring water is a mixture of
several isotopic species of both hydrogen and oxygen,
whose very small percentages are not sufficient to alter the
overall chemical and thermodynamic properties of ordinary
water at the macroscopic level. This is the reason why isotopic
varieties are normally included in the extension of ‘water’, and
not classified as separate substances.31 In particular, the very
low D/H ratio in naturally occurring water means we will
30 A clarification is in order here. The above observation is not meant to
be a sweeping claim to the effect that it would be unconceivable to take iso-
topic varieties (say, protium and tritium, where the latter is radioactive) as
two different substances. Instead, the observation above is meant to be a
simple remark that given our current periodic table, and given Bohr’s
victory over the role of atomic number in the classification of elements, it
just happens that in any Putnamian-like baptism of D2O in our actual
world isotopic varieties of water are not normally classified as different sub-
stances. Appealing to the intuition that one is radioactive and the other is
not, does not begin to show that they should or could be counted as two sep-
arate substances.
31 I do not want to suggest that low concentration of substances in
nature is a ground for not counting them as distinct kinds. If this were the
case, then many substances (e.g. rare earths) would not qualify as distinct
kinds, which is obviously false. Instead, I am making the more modest
claim that given the low percentage of isotopic varieties (such as deuterium
oxide) in naturally occurring water, there is no paradigm sample for
LaPorte’s imagined baptism of D2O as not a kind of water in our planet.
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never encounter aDeuteriumEarth’s ocean, or any significant
amount of naturally occurring deuterium oxide that could
serve as a paradigm sample for the Earthlings’ imagined
baptism (because of chemical macroscopic differences with
our ordinary H2O), pace LaPorte’s fictional scenario. The
only significant amount of D2O that we could encounter and
that could function as a paradigm sample for the Earthlings’
imagined baptism would be industrially produced via causal
mechanisms involving either distillation or chemical ex-
change from ordinary water. But this would undercut the see-
mingly probative force of LaPorte’s thought-experiment as
presumably the quantities so produced would not count as
naturally occurring in our actual world (which is a key aspect
of any Putnamian-like baptism – see more on this point in
Section 4.1).
Thus, either the Deuterium Earth’s ocean sample does not meet con-
dition (I.) (because of i.); or it does meet condition (I.) at the cost of
not being a paradigm sample of deuterium oxide (because of ii.).
Ordinary D2O does bear same microstructural-kind relation to ordin-
ary H2O to deserve The Times’s appellative of ‘a new kind of water’.
LaPorte suggests that the Earthlings’ conclusion that D2O is not a
kind of water is justified by the absence of same microstructural kind
relation to what we ordinarily call ‘water’,32 given that the liquid
does not support aquatic forms of life, has a different melting and
freezing point, etc. But as it happens, at the bare microstructural
level and physical properties at the molar basis, there are no over-
whelming differences between the physical properties of ordinary
H2O and those of ordinary D2O. The differences arise at the macro-
structural level, where thermodynamic properties enter, due to the
complex dynamics of liquid water. Thus, to claim that D2O may
not be counted as a kind of water on the basis of these macroscopic
thermodynamic properties would not per se undermine the
Putnamian claim that D2O does bear the same microstructural kind
relation to the majority of what we have been calling ‘water’ all along.
But there is more. Most of what we have been calling ‘water’ con-
sists of an isotopic mixture at the microstructural level, with tap
waters from various countries easily differing by as much as 15
percent in the D/H ratio.33 And in the absence of a single sample
32 Op. cit. note 1, 107.
33 H. Craig ‘Standard for reporting concentrations of deuterium and
oxygen-18 in natural waters’, Science vol. 133, No. 3467 (1961), 1833.
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of average ocean water easily available to circulate widely, a new ‘stan-
dard mean ocean water’ (SMOW) was defined in relation to the
National Bureau of Standards isotopic reference sample No. 1
(NBS-1), such that
D/H (SMOW) ≡ 1.050 D/H (NBS-1)
‘thus tying the standard to a sample readily available for world-wide
distribution’.34 With the new SMOW in place, it has been possible to
measure the deuterium enrichments per millage in various samples of
ocean water, ranging from the−0.7 of the Atlantic, to the+0.9 of the
Pacific, and+0.1 of the Indian ocean, leading to an averageD/Hratio
of 1/6328.35
The standards used to measure the deuterium enrichments of
ocean waters might be regarded as conventional stipulations. But
they do not make the inclusion of deuterium enrichments into the
kind ‘water’ itself a stipulation, nor do they make the Pacific ocean
more ‘dwatery’ than the Atlantic! On the contrary, our resilient use
of the term ‘water’ to designate average ocean water and the scientific
quest for a consistent measurement standard for its isotopic varieties
speaks against the seemingly probative force of LaPorte’s thought-
experiment. If we take the term ‘water’ to designate the life-support-
ing liquid we are accustomed to from lakes, oceans, and rain, then
given the very small (average) D/H ratio in naturally occurring
water, we are justified in taking isotopic varieties as one kind of
chemical substance that we have been calling ‘water’ all along.
Moreover, if we consider that pure D2O does not occur naturally,
then the term ‘water’ used to designate Earth’s ocean liquid, and
the term ‘dwater’ used to designate Deuterium Earth’s ocean
liquid, would presumably both refer to isotopic mixtures, distin-
guished only by different ratios of D/H content (low on planet
Earth, and high on Deuterium Earth). But then the difference
between the Earth’s ocean liquid and the Deuterium Earth’s one
would be just a matter of degree. And if the Earth’s ocean liquid de-
serves the name of ‘water’ despite being an isotopic mixture, one may
wonder why the Deuterium Earth’s ocean liquid should be denied
such an appellative.
To sum up so far, if at the microstructural level ordinary D2O and
ordinary H2O do not differ that much and if the macroscopic differ-
ences (arising at the level of thermodynamic properties) are presum-
ably supervenient on the physical properties at the microstructural
34 Op. cit note 33, 1833.
35 Op. cit, 1833.
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level,36 the case can be made for why facts about the D2O content of
Deuterium Earth’s ocean liquid underwrite the conclusion that it is,
after all, an isotopic kind of water. Since LaPorte’s story relies heavily
on those facts, the Deuterium Earth story does not license the con-
clusion that we could have gone either way in taking D2O as a kind
of water or not.
But it is not just the scientific credibility of the vernacular kind term
‘dwater’ (i.e. meaning ‘not-a-kind-of-water’) that is at stake here. As I
am going to argue in the next Section, also from a semantic point of
view, ‘dwater’ is not on a par with ‘heavy water’. Recall that in
LaPorte’s story both Earthlings and Earth scientists have apparently
access to the same scientific information about the microstructural
nature of deuterium oxide; they just happen to use two different verna-
cular kind terms to refer to D2O. LaPorte’s story does not tell us
whether the Earthlings prior to 1935 know or use the scientific kind
term ‘deuterium oxide’. All we know is that they call ‘dwater’ what
the Earth scientists call ‘heavy water’. Let us grant that they both
refer to the same microstructure, namely D2O, but they diverge
about vernacular kind terms.
I contend that the two vernacular kind terms are not semantically
on a par, because vernacular kind terms are opaque, so to speak,
under coextensive predicate substitution.37 Despite both ‘dwater’
and ‘heavy water’ being coextensive with the predicate ‘being
D2O’, it is not the case that we can substitute ‘dwater’ for ‘heavy
water’ in any sentence in which the latter appears (e.g. in inductive
inferences) and preserve the projectibility of the term. The reason
is that despite having the same extension (D2O), ‘dwater’ and
‘heavy water’ have different intensions. ‘Dwater’ is the vernacular
kind term given to D2O in a fictional baptism where all the available
evidence about macroscopic properties (melting and freezing points,
poisonous nature for living creatures, and so forth) suggests that
the substance in question is not a kind of water. Vice versa, ‘heavy
water’ is the vernacular kind term given to D2O in the real baptism
36 See footnote 27.
37 I echo here Fred Dretske’s (‘Laws of nature’, Philosophy of science 44
(1977), 248–68) similar argument for laws of nature intended as necessita-
tion relations between universal properties. In that context, the opacity
under co-extensive predicate substitution serves as an argument for the
view that laws cannot be understood as true universal generalizations. In
my case, the opacity under co-extensive predicate substitution serves as an
argument for the view that we cannot interchange co-extensive vernacular
kind terms in inductive inferences, salva projectibility.
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by The Times in December 1933, where the available evidence about
the very low percentage of this isotopic variety in naturally occurring
water suggested that the substance in question was a kind of water.
Thus, co-extensivity notwithstanding, the different intensions trans-
late into the two terms being opaque under co-extensive predicate
substitution. Opacity has consequences for the projectibility of the
terms. In particular, it gives rise to a dilemma. Either the two
terms are not interchangeable because, as I am going to show in the
next Section, while ‘heavy water’ is projectible, ‘dwater’ is not. Or,
for them to be interchangeable in inductive inferences salva project-
ibility, ‘dwater’ would have to be construed as synonymous with
‘heavy water’, i.e. as a kind of water, undermining in this way
LaPorte’s story that ‘dwater’ denotes D2O as not-a-kind-of-water.
4. Why ‘dwater’ does not have the same semantic status
of ‘heavy water’. A Goodmanian twist to the Deuterium
Earth story.
Should the Earthlings then agree with the Earth scientists that the
Deuterium Earth’s ocean liquid is, after all, a kind of water? In the
light of the discussion in the previous Section, and in the absence
of two alternative systems of chemical classification for D2O in
current chemistry,38 it would prove hard to resist this conclusion.
Let us grant then that the Earthlings eventually agree with the
Earth scientists, upon hearing their report in 1935, that D2O is
after all, a new kind of water. But they insist on preferring their
own vernacular kind term ‘dwater’, as opposed to ‘heavy water’, to
mark the significant differences between the two liquids at themacro-
structural level. The imagined dialogue may go as follows:
Earth scientists: ‘So, you can see that the Deuterium Earth’s
ocean liquid is after all a kind of water in the light of its physical
properties on a molar scale, and very low ratio in naturally occur-
ring isotopic mixtures’.
38 LaPorte’s analogous case for biological kind terms (op. cit. note 1, ch.
3) is more successful than his case for chemical kind terms, in my view, pre-
cisely because in biology there are competing biological schools (cladistics
and evolutionary taxonomy), for classifying biological species and higher
taxa. The present article should then be read not as an attempt to criticise
LaPorte’s view tout court, but instead as raising a difficulty for extending
his account to chemical kind terms (at least, in the specific case of deuterium
oxide).
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Earthlings: ‘Fine. But we really feel that your vernacular kind
term “heavy water” under-represents the very peculiar chemical
features of the new liquid, and creates the potentially misleading
association with what we ordinarily call “water”. After all,
“water” is associated with a life-supporting liquid, whereas
this liquid here is poisonous to all higher forms of life. We’d
rather stick to our original term “dwater” to demarcate the
chemical difference between the two. The two vernacular kind
terms “dwater” and “heavy water” are on a par from a semantic
point of view. They both refer to the same stuff, namely D2O.
Yet they mark an important difference. “Dwater” refers to
D2O not as a kind of water, i.e. it refers to D2O with respect to
those aspects in which it differs from what we ordinarily call
“water”.’
Earth scientists: ‘Do you mean with respect to the relevant ther-
modynamic differences at the macroscopic level, such as temp-
erature of maximum density, and hence boiling and freezing
points, and its implications for glucose oxidation and ATP
synthesis?’
Earthlings: ‘Yes, precisely. We feel that those relevant differ-
ences deserve a brand new name, at a sufficient distance from
“water” and associates (i.e. “heavy water”). Had we been at the
Royal Society meeting in 1933 when the issue of the name was
highly debated, we would have pushed for this alternative
option. After all, it is only a semantic stipulation whether we
include D2O into the existing kind term “water” (and just add
an adjective to it) or we coin a new name for it. Semantically,
“dwater” is on equal footing with “heavy water” and could be
used interchangeably with it: it could feature into the same in-
ductive inferences’.
Earth scientists: ‘Unfortunately, you are late in the dispute about
naming. The choice has already been made.’
Earthlings: ‘But things could have gone otherwise. Had our
expedition come back two years earlier, we would have lobbied
for the alternative name “dwater” and won the battle at the
Royal Society meeting, where, from what we have heard, some
scientists like Aston shared our feelings.’
What should we make of the Earthlings’ thesis of semantic stipula-
tion? To be defensible, one must prove that the two vernacular kind
terms ‘dwater’ (as the Earthlings dub the Deuterium Earth’s liquid)
and ‘heavy water’ (as the Earth scientists call it) are semantically on a
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par. But, in fact, if we take LaPorte seriously – i.e. that there is no
Putnamian fact of the matter as to whether deuterium oxide is or is
not a kind of water (i.e. that D2O content is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient to fix the reference of the term, and that it is only a matter of
refining our vague use of kind terms) – then an unwelcome
Goodmanian scenario may arise.
Projectibility39 is a distinctive feature of natural kind terms under a
variety of alternative accounts (from Boyd’s and Kornblith’s realism
about kinds, to Hacking’s nominalism, and Kuhn’s constructi-
vism).40 Kind terms must be projectible for them to be the basis of
successful inductive inferences in science.41 Thus, for ‘dwater’ to
39 At the end ofFact, Fiction, and Forecast, Goodman suggested that his
analysis of projectibility could be used to distinguish between genuine and
artificial kinds, or more genuine from less genuine ones: ‘For surely the en-
trenchment of classes is somemeasure of their genuineness as kinds; roughly
speaking, two things are the most akin according as there is a more specific
and better entrenched predicate that applies to both’, N. Goodman Fact,
Fiction, and Forecast, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 123.
40 R. Boyd ‘Realism, anti-foundationalism, and the enthusiasm for
natural kinds’, Philosophical Studies 61 (1991), 127–48. H. Kornblith
Inductive inference and its natural ground. An essay in naturalistic epistemology
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). I. Hacking ‘Working in a New
World: the Taxonomic Solution’, on P. Horwich (ed.) World Changes.
Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1993), 275–310. T. Kuhn ‘Afterwards’, in P. Horwich (ed.) World
Changes. Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1993), 311–39. While Goodman’s notion of projectibility is
tied to his notion of entrenchment (i.e. how often a predicate or a natural
kind term has been successfully projected in the past), some philosophers
after Goodman have married projectibility to truth as in Boyd’s case,
where kind terms are said to be projectible because they latch onto the
causal structure of the world (Boyd, op. cit., 139). Other philosophers
have retained projectibility without giving an account of it in terms of
truth or entrenchment (as in Hacking’s case). Others, like Kuhn (1993,
op. cit., 315–9), have defended projectibility within the context of a prima
facie constructivist position. In what follows, I am going to be noncommittal
about the nature of projectibility and I take it simply as a measure of natural
kind terms’ amenability to supporting successful inductive inferences.
41 One may be suspicious about projectibility on the ground of
Popperian doubts about the success of our inductive inferences in general.
But this would be a non-sequitur. One of the key motivations for natural
kinds is that they are meant to support our inductive inferences and expla-
nations, quite independently of whether one is realist, nominalist or con-
structivist about kinds (as clarified in the footnote above). Even a
Popperian, with reservations about our ability to project into the future,
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be semantically on a par with ‘heavy water’, one must show that it is
projectible, i.e. that it supports successful inductive inferences. But
‘dwater’ is in fact vulnerable to the new riddle of induction, as the fol-
lowing Goodmanian twist to LaPorte’s story shows. In Section 4.2, I
consider some possible responses to it, and conclude that none of
them successfully evades the Goodmanian scenario.
4.1. A Goodmanian twist to the Deuterium Earth story
Let us go back to the beginning of our story. It is the year of the
expedition (1905) and the Earthlings have just landed on Deuterium
Earth with a jar containing ocean-water. The liquid inside the jar
looks prima facie identical to the liquid that fills the ocean on
Deuterium Earth. But they soon realise that there are some important
differences between the two. They decide to dub the non-better-
identified microstructure of the Deuterium Earth’s liquid as PQR.
Eventually, through sophisticated testing, the Earthlings find out
that the ocean-liquid consists of an oxygen atom and two hydrogen
atoms that happen to have a bigger mass than the hydrogen atoms
known to them, because of an additional neutron in the nucleus.
They aptly dub the chemical element ‘deuterium’ in homage to
Deuterium Earth, re-dub accordingly the microstructure of the
ocean-liquid as D2O, and the ocean-liquid itself as ‘dwater’ to mark
the difference from ‘water’ of planet Earth. So far, this bit of the
story follows exactly LaPorte’s. Here is now the Goodmanian twist.
By dubbing the ocean-liquid ‘dwater’, upon inspecting several
samples, the Earthlings draw the following inductive generalization:
(A) The liquid that fills the ocean on Deuterium Earth is dwater.
Many years elapse. It is the year 1935: the Earthlings return at last to
planet Earth, with a jar containing the ocean-liquid from Deuterium
Earth. The Earth scientists compare the liquid with samples of a new
would owe us an account of why inductive inferences about green emeralds
have been successful up to date. And normally such an account would
involve reference to natural kinds, quite independently of which view of
natural kinds one favours (i.e. again realist, nominalist, or constructivist),
and independently also of what view one endorses about the relation
between natural kinds and dispositional properties, for example (e.g.,
whether kind membership can be identified with a set of necessary and suf-
ficient dispositional properties).
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chemical element they have just identified as deuterium, and whose
combination with oxygen gives deuterium oxide or ‘heavy water’,
as they call the new isotopic kind of water. By comparing several
samples, the Earth scientists conclude
(B) The liquid that fills the ocean on Deuterium Earth is heavy
water.
The Earth scientists go on to explain to the Earthlings all the recent
events concerning the discovery of the new isotope, as per Section 3
above. The Earthlings, faced with the new pieces of evidence even-
tually agree with the Earth scientists that from a scientific point of
view, it is after all a new kind of water. But they insist on using their
old terminology ‘dwater’ to mark semantically the difference from or-
dinary water, which they perceive as blurred by the term ‘heavy water’.
They also claim, as we saw in Section 4, that ‘dwater’ is semantically on
equal footing with ‘heavy water’: they can both be used interchange-
ably in inductive inferences. It is after all just a matter of semantic sti-
pulation (as opposed to discovery) – they argue, along LaPorte’s lines –
that the new liquid ended up being classified as a kind of water.
Now, if this were the case, the Earthlings would be vulnerable to the
new riddle of induction. The term ‘dwater’would be like Goodman’s
grue: something is dwater if and only if it is first examined prior to
time t (say, 1935) and found to be not-a-kind-of-water; or, it is exam-
ined after time t and found to be a-kind-of-water. If there is no fact of
the matter as to whether D2O is or is not a kind of water and if D2O
content is neither necessary nor sufficient to fix the reference of the
term, and we could have gone either way – then the Earthlings (who
in 1935 are likely to accept the Earth scientists’ conclusion as per
Section 3) would be vulnerable to drawing ‘gruified’ (or better ‘dwa-
teried’) inductive inferences like (A), whereby at time t (namely, in
1935) the same evidence that supports the Earth scientists’ statement
(B), namely that the liquid that fills the ocean onDeuteriumEarth is a
kind of water (called ‘heavy water’), supports also the Earthlings’ par-
allel statement (A) that the liquid that fills the ocean on Deuterium
Earth is not a kind of water (called ‘dwater’).
Let me clarify this point. If one endorses the Putnamian view that
the meaning of a natural kind term is not fixed by what Putnam calls
the stereotype,42 i.e. the various beliefs speakers may associate with
42 Putnam (‘The meaning of “meaning”’, in H. Putnam Mind,
Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers vol. 2, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), 269) famously defined the meaning
of a word (say ‘water’) as a four-component vector, including: 1. Semantic
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the term (for example, in the case of ‘dwater’, beliefs concerning its
poisonous nature, its ability to be used in a weapon and so on), but
it is instead fixed by the extension of the term (e.g. D2O),43 then in
every possible world (including Deuterium Earth), in which a sub-
stance bears same microstructural-kind relation to what we ordinarily
call ‘water’ on planet Earth (intended in the way specified in
Section 3 above, i.e. in the Earth scientists’ sense of ‘water’ as includ-
ing all its isotopic varieties), that substance would count as a kind of
‘water’. Under the Putnamian account, D2O content is necessary
and sufficient to fix the reference of the natural kind term.
Moreover, the Kripkean rigidity of natural kind terms is understood
as following from the fact that when we (in the actual world) give the
ostensive definition ‘this liquid (say, deuterium oxide) is a kind of
water’, we intend that for every possible worldW and every possible
liquid x inW, x is a kind of water if and only if x bears the samemicro-
structural-kind relation to the entity referred to as ‘this’ in the actual
world (i.e., in the Earth scientists’world).44 For Putnam, natural kind
terms are rigid designators to the extent that the Putnamian meaning
of ‘meaning’ is fixed by ostensive definition of paradigm samples in
our actual world.
By rejecting Putnam’s meaning of ‘meaning’, and by re-coupling
Kripkean rigidity to some form of semantic stipulation, LaPorte
suggests that natural kind terms can still be rigid designators de jure
(not de facto), but whether or not this liquid (e.g. deuterium oxide)
counts as a kind of water is ultimately a matter of speakers’ decision:
we decided to count it as such, but we might as well have decided other-
wise (had we had the first encounter with this liquid that the
Earthlings, for example, had on Deuterium Earth). However, the
reasons why the Earthlings – in this hypothetical first encounter
scenario – did not count this liquid as a kind of water seem to have
nothing to do with any fact of the matter about the isotopic nature
of deuterium oxide per se, and all to do with the Earthlings’ beliefs
marker (e.g. natural kind; liquid); 2. Syntactic marker (e.g. mass noun, con-
crete); 3. Stereotype (e.g. colorless; transparent;…); and 4. Extension (e.g.
H2O). Putnam identified the meaning of ‘meaning’ with the extension of
the word.
43 Recall that for Putnam, op. cit. note 42, 270, ‘although we have to use
a description of the extension to give the extension, we think of the com-
ponent in question as being the extension (the set), not the description of
the extension’.
44 See Putnam, op. cit., 231, on this point.
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about the poisonous nature of the liquid, its ability to be used in a
weapon, and so on (what Putnam would call the stereotype of a
natural kind term). Had the Earthlings’ had alternative beliefs
about this liquid, the liquid might have counted as a kind of water,
after all.
Moral: once we dispense with the Putnamian view that there is a fact
of the matter as to whether this liquid (deuterium oxide) here in our
actual world is a kind of water (also called ‘heavy water’), and once we
open the door to the alternative view that whether D2O is or is not a
kind of water is ultimately a matter of semantic stipulation, nothing
seems to prevent the Earthlings from coining a new term such as
‘dwater’ (following LaPorte’s own suggestion) and drawing dwateried
inductive inferences from it. Goodman’s grue could become an unwel-
come real possibility, given the thesis of semantic stipulation.
4.2. Four possible responses to the Goodmanian twist
(1) First response: serendipity
Given the way LaPorte designs the Deuterium Earth story, one may
reply that the Goodmanian scenario is at worst innocuous, and at best
a blessing. After time t (1935) the inductive generalizations that the
Earthlings draw for ‘dwater’ coincide with the inductive generaliz-
ations that the Earth scientists are drawing for ‘heavy water’ as an iso-
topic variety of water. While gruified inferences diverge after time t,
dwateried inferences serendipitously converge after time t.
But the serendipitous convergence cannot be backtracked45 prior to
time t. Prior to time t, the same evidence (a jar of ocean-liquid) would
support divergent inductive inferences for the Earthlings, whowould
conclude that it is not a kind of water, and the Earth scientists, who
would identify it as an isotopic kind of water. Nor can one reply
that prior to time t (i.e. 1935) the problem did not arise because the
Earth scientists did not know about deuterium oxide, nor could
draw inductive inferences about it. The Earth scientists knew about
45 Goodman’s paradox does not just apply to predictions about future
cases, but more in general to inductive inferences involving projections
from examined cases to (past, present, and future) unexamined cases. See
on this point E. Sober, ‘No model, no inference: a Bayesian primer on the
grue problem’, in D. Stalker (ed.) Grue, the New Riddle of Induction (La
Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), 193–223; and R.
Israel ‘Two interpretations of grue – or how to misunderstand the new
riddle of induction’, Analysis 64 (2004), 335–9.
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deuterium as early as 1931 when Urey identified it as an isotope of
hydrogen by evaporating liquid hydrogen at low temperatures.
(2) Second response: non-projectibility
Another strategy could be to bite the bullet and concede that ‘dwater’
is non-projectible (any more than ‘grue’ is). In particular, while the
vernacular kind term ‘heavy water’ is entrenched in the Earth scien-
tists’ vocabulary, ‘dwater’ is not. The former has been successfully
projected in the past, while the latter has not. Moreover, the former
enter in the Earth scientists’ vocabulary together with a series of
laws of nature; the latter does not. One could then grant that
‘dwater’ is non-projectible. But the biting-the-bullet strategy
would not help here. If ‘dwater’ has to bear the semantic weight
that LaPorte’s story attaches to it with the thesis of semantic stipula-
tion, it ought to be projectible for it to be an alternative live option on
equal footing with ‘heavy water’.
(3) Third response: referential coincidence
Here is a more promising reply onemight consider. ‘Dwater’ is in fact
projectible (or, at least, as projectible as ‘heavy water’) since they are
just two different vernacular kind terms referring toD2O. It is tempt-
ing to think that the Goodmanian scenario does not arise, because,
after all, both prior to and after time t (i.e. 1935), ‘dwater’ picks
out D2O: the Earthlings and the Earth scientists are simply using
two different terms (‘dwater’ and ‘heavy water’) to refer exactly to
the same liquid with the same microstructure.
Tempting as it is, there is however a major problem with this
response. This line of argument is simply precluded to LaPorte,
who against Putnam denies thatD2O content is necessary and sufficient
to fix the reference of the term. So, unlessLaPorte embraces Putnam’s
view that D2O content is necessary and sufficient to fix the reference
of both ‘heavy water’ and ‘dwater’, it is difficult to see how he could
avail himself of this response. Although ‘dwater’ refers to D2O
all along in LaPorte’s story, precisely because LaPorte does not
accept Putnam’s causal theory of reference, and defends instead
the view that the two terms ‘heavy water’ and ‘dwater’ pick out differ-
ent descriptions about D2O (as an isotopic kind-of-water versus
not-a-kind-of-water, respectively), the Goodmanian scenario cannot
be easily averted. Same microstructure notwithstanding, the two
terms have different intensions. ‘Dwater’ is introduced in the
Earthlings’ baptism to connote D2O in those aspects in which it
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differs significantly from ordinary water (e.g., macroscopic, chemical
properties associated with its being poisonous, having different freez-
ing andmelting points). ‘Heavywater’ is introduced in theEarth scien-
tists’ baptism to connote D2O in those aspects in which it bears
sufficient similarity with ordinary water (e.g. microscopic, physical
properties associated with its isotopic nature). ‘Dwater’ connotes
D2O as not-a-kind-of-water. ‘Heavy water’ connotes D2O as a-kind-
of-water. By connoting different properties of D2O (or, if you like,
by associating different descriptions, or different intensions to D2O),
the two terms are opaque under co-extensive predicate substitution,
with the result that they cannot be interchanged in inductive inferences
salva projectibility: while ‘heavy water’ is projectible, ‘dwater’ is not.
In particular, in 1935, upon their return to planet Earth and upon
hearing the above report from the Earth scientists (as per Section 3),
the Earthlings are likely to accept that from a scientific point of view
the paradigm sample of Deuterium Earth’s ocean liquid bears the
same (or sufficiently similar)microstructural kind relation towhatwe or-
dinarily call ‘water’, making ‘dwater’ no more projectible than ‘grue’.
(4) Fourth response: stipulation versus discovery
Onemight rejoin that LaPorte’s view escapes the problem because we
did not discover that D2O is a kind of water any more than we discov-
ered that H2O is water. If it is just a matter of semantic stipulation
whether D2O counts as a kind of water, it is not after all paradoxical
that something that does not count as a variety of water prior to time t,
may count as such after t.
But the problem remains. For the case to be made that the
Earthlings’ option of not counting D2O as a kind of water is seman-
tically on a par with the Earth scientists’ alternative option (hence, for
the two terms ‘dwater’ and ‘heavy water’ to be interchangeable in in-
ductive inferences), ‘dwater’ would have to be construed as synon-
ymous with ‘heavy water’, i.e. it would have to be surreptitiously
construed as connoting D2O as a kind-of-water. It is not surprising
that ‘coincidentally’46 (and in blissful ignorance of) the Earthlings
arrive at the same conclusions of the Earth scientists about the
atomic microstructure of deuterium oxide (without in fact even
knowing anything about isotopes, or knowing the difference
between microscopic atomic-number-dependent and macroscopic
atomic-weight-dependent properties), and even about its chemical
reactions in a H-bomb, twenty or so years before one was in fact
46 LaPorte, op. cit. note 1, 107.
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built and tested on planet Earth (in the early 1950s with the conse-
quent destruction of the Bikini Atoll in Micronesia). Without men-
tioning that the ‘sophisticated techniques’ through which the
Earthlings eventually learn about the unusual hydrogen composition
of the ocean-liquid are presumably one and the same distillation tech-
niques used byHaroldUrey in 1931 to identify the hydrogen isotope.
In sum, to escape the Goodmanian scenario and argue for the pro-
jectibility of ‘dwater’ as a semantically live option on a par with ‘heavy
water’, one must pack into the term ‘dwater’ as many scientific
assumptions as possible about the D2O content as an isotopic kind-
of-water, including its far-away-in-the-future performance in an
H-bomb (with a Deuterium Earth-equivalent of the Bikini Atoll).
In this way, the projectibility of ‘dwater’ becomes parasitic on the
projectibility of ‘heavy water’ as an isotopic kind of water.
But if the projectibility of ‘dwater’ is ultimately parasitic upon the
projectibility of ‘heavy water’ (because scientific facts about the D2O
content determine the reference of ‘dwater’ as much as they deter-
mine the reference of ‘heavy water’), then the two are no longer
alternative options. The Deuterium Earth story would no longer
support the thesis of semantic stipulation, according to which we
could have gone either way in taking D2O as a kind of water or not.
5. Conclusion
This is after all only a story. We do not have competing chemical
schools, classifying D2O, respectively, as a kind of water or not (by
contrast with biology, where there are competing biological schools
for the classification of higher taxa). Perhaps an account of what
makes both ‘heavy water’ and ‘dwater’ projectible (without falling
back onto Putnamian assumptions about the D2O content being
necessary and sufficient to fix the reference of the terms) is available
within the resources of LaPorte’s view. Perhaps rigidity de jure of
kind terms can be of some help here. But LaPorte gives no indication
of how an account of projectibility would look like within the re-
sources of his view of natural kind terms. And without such an
account, the received chemical orthodoxy that D2O is an isotopic
kind of water, and that Deuterium Earth’s ocean is watery after all,
seems to stand unscathed.
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